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Many have argued that the major source of the existing global macroeconomic imbalances 
are the twin deficits of the United States (US). However, there is still a debate about whether 
the global imbalances indeed pose a significant threat to the world economy. This matter is 
settled by arguing that the global imbalances acted as a “handmaiden” to the 2008 financial 
crisis. One way to reduce global imbalances is to reform the international monetary system 
and reduce the role of the US dollar as a reserve currency. Robert Triffin was one of those 
critical of this “exorbitant” privilege granted to the US, which makes it both a system maker 
and privilege taker. The Triffin Dilemma captures the fundamental instability that underlies 
the dollar reserve system. However, there are major obstacles to this proposal. Some 
analysts including Triffin cited the US security umbrella as the primary reason the US and its 
major allies would want to retain the role of the dollar in global trade and finance despite the 
underlying inequities in the system. This is related to the imbalance in global governance 
which is largely US-centric. The imbalance in global governance is also reflected in the 
dominance of the US financial system brought about by the “first-mover advantage”. 
Because of the inertia brought about by the imbalance in global governance, economic 
arguments to reform the international monetary system are likely to be trumped by political 
reality. The paper analyzes whether current efforts in East Asia in terms of financial and 
monetary cooperation and rebalancing of economic growth could significantly mitigate the 
adverse impacts of a global system that will still be dominated by the US dollar in the 
foreseeable future. It also explains why the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is unlikely to 
make significant unilateral adjustments to reduce global macroeconomic imbalances. 
JEL Classification: F31, F33 






1.  Introduction     ................................................................................................................ 3
2.  The International Monetary System    ........................................................................... 4
2.1  Is it a Non-system?    .......................................................................................... 4
2.2  Explaining Global Macroeconomic Imbalances    ................................................ 5
2.3  Global Imbalances and the 2008 Crisis     .......................................................... 10
3.  The Role of the US Dollar    ........................................................................................ 11
3.1  The Triffin Dilemma   ........................................................................................ 12
3.2  System Maker and Privilege Taker    ................................................................ 12
3.3  Support from Major Allies     ............................................................................... 14
3.4  Does a Problem Really Exist?     ........................................................................ 15
3.5  Demand Side versus Supply Side     .................................................................. 16
4.  Political Economy of Reform    .................................................................................... 17
4.1  Narrowing Global Imbalances    ........................................................................ 17
4.2  Reform of the International Financial Architecture     .......................................... 19
4.3  Reform at the Regional Level     ......................................................................... 20
5.  Policy Implications    ................................................................................................... 21
References    ......................................................................................................................... 25
 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Just two years after the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, many economies are 
grappling with the problem of a rapidly depreciating US dollar (hereafter referred to as “dollar”). 
Exchange rate volatility has been a recurring problem since the dollar-gold exchange standard 
was abandoned in 1973 (Figure 1). This was compounded by a sharp increase in global 
macroeconomic imbalances during the past decade. Of greatest concern in matters related to 
the international monetary system are the periodic financial and currency crises that have 
buffeted the global economy. Some experts have argued that the volatile exchange rates, large 
macroeconomic imbalances, and increasingly frequent financial crises are largely due to an 
international monetary system that is inherently unstable and inequitable (Ocampo, 2009; 
Teunissen and Akkerman, 2007; Teunissen and Akkerman, 2006). 























Note:  Real effective exchange rate here is calculated as the inverse of the real effective exchange rate estimated by the 
IMF. 
Source: World development Indicators, World Bank 
Policy responses will depend on the underlying causes of the problem and the constraints 
imposed by political reality. An understanding of these two factors is important. The analysis will 
define appropriate policies at the global, regional, and national level. Even if the problem is well-
defined the appropriate solution may not be feasible because of realpolitik. For example, many 
experts have criticized the ‘exorbitant’ privilege the US enjoys because of the role of the dollar 
as a global currency. However, policies to curb this privilege are constrained by the dominant 




Chapter 2 describes the international monetary system and analyzes its fundamental problems. 
The most significant issue in the analysis is whether these structural problems have fueled the 
global macroeconomic imbalances and whether the latter played a key role in the 2008 crisis. 
The argument has important policy implications. For example, if the structural problems of the 
international monetary system had a minimal role, then the 2008 crisis would be a wake-up call 
in terms of other aspects of the financial system, particularly the regulatory framework. Attention 
will then be diverted away from reforming the international monetary system. 
Chapter 3 deals with one of the key features of the international monetary system: the role of 
the dollar as a global currency and reserve asset. The discussion begins with the well-known 
Triffin Dilemma and then focuses the debate on whether the exorbitant privilege
1
The last part of Chapter 3 takes off from the premise that the ‘exorbitant’ privilege has resulted 
in problems in the international monetary system. This would include the 2008 financial crisis. 
The argument then proceeds to whether it is the “supply” side or “demand” side that is the 
primary cause of the problem. This is where the present debate regarding the role of the 
People’s Republic of China  (henceforth the PRC), particularly the undervaluation of the 
renminbi, can be situated. 
 is actually a 
negative feature. The benefits of the deep and liquid global financial markets that resulted from 
this privilege may have offset the costs resulting from the unstable and inequitable features of 
the international monetary system. 
In Chapter 4, the political economy of reducing the dollar’s role as a global reserve currency is 
discussed. Measures to reduce global imbalances can be considered without having to involve 
the role of the US dollar. However, these also have implications for global governance. The 
likely situation is dominance of the dollar for the foreseeable future. Possible policy prescriptions 
are put forward in Chapter 5. 
In the latter part of the paper, the implications for East Asian economies will be discussed. 
Realpolitik may deem policy responses at the regional level more feasible than global initiatives. 
However, realpolitik may also affect the viability of implementing these policy recommendations.  
2.  THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
2.1  Is it a Non-system? 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods dollar-gold exchange standard, the international 
monetary  system evolved into what can best be described as a fiduciary dollar standard 
(Ocampo, 2009). The dollar remained as the dominant international currency largely by default 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2009). There has been no real anchor for the global reserve currency and 
support for the dollar has been largely based on “confidence” in the economic power and capital 
markets of the US (Teunissen, 2006). The result has been described as a “non-system’” since 
there are no standard rules governing currency and monetary regimes of economies and the 
manner in which interventions are applied in case of problems or crises (Gilpin, 1987; D’Arista 
and Griffith-Jones, 2006; Mateos, Duttagupta, and Goyal, 2009; Visco, 2009). 
The fiduciary dollar standard has been weighed down by market failure. The main reason is that 
exchange rate adjustments and the implementation of policies designed to manage aggregate 
demand have failed to correct economic imbalances, while international capital markets have 
                                                 
1 The “exorbitant” privilege afforded to the US by the international role of the dollar is a term attributed to President 




proved to be an unreliable source of payments financing (Bird, 2010). The latter is considered 
the primary weakness of the “non-system” as financial globalization has resulted in volatile 
capital flows which tend to be pro-cyclical, thus making greater international capital mobility part 
of the problem rather than a possible solution. 
Market failure is the flip side of the fundamental flaws of the system which are described 
succinctly by Ocampo (2009). The first is that there is a deflationary bias in the global economy 
since there is no built-in mechanism to assist countries with current account deficits in their 
adjustment. Meanwhile, economies with surpluses only have an internal reason to adjust and 
this is related to inflationary pressure. They do not have an “external” source of pressure—the 
equivalent of creditors for deficit countries—to move towards balance. The second feature is 
that the system is unstable, which is an outcome of the Triffin Dilemma. This aspect, which 
relates to the dominant role of the dollar, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Finally, 
the system is inequitable because under the fiduciary dollar standard resources are transferred 
from economies accumulating foreign exchange reserves to the major economies that issue the 
global reserve currencies. 
The more important issue is whether or not the fiduciary dollar standard is sustainable. The way 
this issue is addressed in this paper is to determine whether the fiduciary dollar standard 
contributed significantly to the 2008 global financial and economic crisis. This topic is discussed 
more extensively in Chapter 2.2 with reference to the global macroeconomic imbalances. If the 
fiduciary dollar standard did not contribute to the 2008 crisis—or the relation is weak—then the 
debate about the former’s sustainability can be resolved based on the arguments that have 
been made prior to the crisis. 
2.2  Explaining Global Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Global macroeconomic imbalances have been a perennial feature of the international economy. 
However, it is only in the past decade  that they have reached staggering levels. The net 
international liabilities of the US have increased sharply since 2000 (Figure 2) and reached a 
peak of 24% of US gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008, before declining slightly to 19% in 
2009. This was mirrored by a surge in international reserves, particularly those held by the PRC 
















































































































































































Foreign Exchange Reserves of Industrial and Emerging Countries  
(Million US Dollars) 
INDUSTRIAL EMERGING
US Japan EU PRC India Russia Indonesia South Africa TOTAL
Current Current Current Current Share to Tota Current Current Current Current Current
1990 52,193 69,487 - 28,594 4.7 1,205 - 7,353 - 611,739
1991 45,934 61,758 - 42,664 6.6 3,580 - 9,151 - 647,372
1992 40,005 61,888 - 19,443 2.9 5,461 - 10,181 - 674,564
1993 41,532 88,720 - 21,199 2.8 9,807 5,829 10,988 - 752,362
1994 41,215 115,146 - 51,620 6.4 19,386 3,976 11,820 - 812,894
1995 49,096 172,443 - 73,579 7.9 17,467 14,265 13,306 - 934,955
1996 38,294 207,335 - 105,029 9.6 19,742 11,271 17,820 - 1,089,230
1997 30,809 207,866 - 139,890 11.7 24,324 12,771 16,088 - 1,197,890
1998 36,001 203,215 - 144,959 12.4 26,958 7,800 22,401 - 1,167,450
1999 32,182 277,708 227,989 154,675 11.9 31,992 8,455 26,245 6,065 1,298,310
2000 31,238 347,212 218,633 165,574 11.1 37,264 24,263 28,280 5,793 1,486,120
2001 28,981 387,727 207,817 212,165 13.0 45,251 32,538 27,048 5,765 1,630,880
2002 33,818 451,458 215,812 286,407 16.2 66,994 44,051 30,754 5,601 1,771,200
2003 39,722 652,790 188,173 403,251 19.8 97,617 73,172 34,742 6,164 2,035,750
2004 42,718 824,264 181,196 609,932 25.3 125,164 120,805 34,724 12,794 2,413,610
2005 37,838 828,813 167,150 818,872 27.1 131,018 175,690 32,926 18,260 3,022,610
2006 40,944 874,936 184,034 1,066,340 30.5 170,187 295,277 40,866 22,720 3,490,680
2007 45,804 948,356 203,189 1,528,250 36.0 266,553 466,376 54,737 29,234 4,239,370
2008 49,584 1,003,670 201,969 1,946,030 40.9 246,603 410,695 49,339 30,238 4,763,730
2009 50,520 996,955 194,411 2,399,150 46.1 258,583 405,825 60,572 32,432 5,208,370
2010 QI 48,885 990,926 197,244 2,447,080 44.8 254,685 412,834 66,326 34,779 5,458,700
2010 Q2 47,557 996,096 194,820 2,454,280 43.1 249,628 422,778 70,609 34,556 5,694,640
2010 Q3 51,709 1,051,920 206,500 2,648,300 45.9 265,231 447,567 80,520 35,980 5,774,510
2010 Q4 - - - - - - - - - -  
Source: IFS 
Note: 9.3% growth rate of total reserves in 2010. Q2 is compared to 2009 figure 
This  chapter  describes how the imbalances are a manifestation of the key features of the 
fiduciary dollar system. The main issue then becomes whether the global imbalances are 
sustainable. There are essentially two contending views, labeled either as orthodox vs. 
heterodox (White, 2007) or equilibrium vs. disequilibrium (Serven and Nguyen, 2010). These 
categories correspond with each other: orthodox corresponds to equilibrium, while heterodox 
corresponds to disequilibrium. 
The equilibrium approach emphasizes structural factors and domestic policies that have 
resulted in the steady accumulation of assets in the US by the rest of the world. This outcome 
has also been labeled as the ”new Bretton Woods” or Bretton Woods II. Structural factors focus 
on the capital account and international asymmetries in the supply of and demand for financial 
assets. The rise in income and wealth of emerging economies leads to an increase in their 
demand for assets in economies with more advanced financial markets, particularly the US. 
This is largely because most emerging economies have underdeveloped financial sectors and 
therefore limited options for portfolio diversification. The increase in demand for US assets is 
met by widening US current account deficits that raise the supply of these assets for 




long as emerging economies continue to grow. If in the future their financial systems become 
more sophisticated, the global imbalances will narrow. 
The other version of the equilibrium approach elaborates on the policy of emerging economies 
to accumulate external assets. One variant characterizes emerging economies as “new 
mercantilists”, wherein the desire to maintain export competitiveness leads to an obsession with 
undervalued currencies. The most straightforward mechanism is to compress domestic 
spending, particularly consumption, and allocate resources to the export industry. The outcome 
will be persistent current account surpluses and an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 
Meanwhile, the rapid accumulation of reserves by emerging economies in the past decade has 
brought up the possibility that this is a form of self-insurance against the periodic financial crises 
that have global repercussions. Economies have a precautionary motive to maintain a large 
pool of reserves. In order to mitigate this need, various economies can practice reserve-pooling. 
A related proposal will be mentioned in Chapter 4.3. 
The ‘orthodox’ interpretation of the widening of global imbalances follows the equilibrium 
approach described earlier.
2
The “disequilibrium approach” posits that the global macroeconomic imbalances reflect a 
violation of the inter-temporal budget constraint. The latter implies that an economy’s net liability 
position vis-à-vis the rest of the world at any given time cannot exceed the present value of its 
future current account surpluses. Analysts point to the steep decline in net foreign assets of the 
US as an indication that the global imbalances are unsustainable (Figure 2). Rather than being 
an indication of inter-temporal optimization, the decline reflects excessive private and public 
spending—i.e., the US has been living beyond its means (D’Arista and Griffith-Jones, 2006). 
Eventually the imbalances have to be corrected and this can happen in either an orderly or 
disorderly fashion. 
  The global imbalances are linked to improved relative growth 
prospects in deficit countries and inflows of foreign capital driven by higher expected rates of 
return. The more prominent explanation is that the increase in productivity growth in the US 
attracted capital inflows that strengthened the dollar and resulted in a current account deficit. 
Meanwhile, the high saving propensities in emerging economies, particularly in Asia, have led to 
a large savings-investment imbalance. The highly liberalized and more sophisticated financial 
markets of deficit countries then provided investment opportunities for these surplus funds. 
The ”less orthodox” view expounded by White (2007) view is an extension of the “disequilibrium” 
approach. The analysis combines the  phenomenon of asymmetric monetary policy and the 
liberalization of the global financial system. These two factors explain the period of easy credit 
and low interest rates during most of the 1990s and 2000s. 
An anti-inflationary bias has characterized monetary policy in industrialized economies since 
1980. Some analysts are puzzled, therefore, by the distinct trend towards easing of monetary 
policy as reflected in the decline in real interest rates in major industrial countries (White, 2007). 
The possible reason is an asymmetry in monetary policy wherein the process of easing is more 
pronounced during times of economic slowdowns than is the process of tightening during 
economic upturns. The low-interest rate regimes in industrialized countries sparked a surge in 
capital flows to developing countries (Table 2). The subsequent recycling by official reserve 
managers of these inflows back into the industrial economies particularly the US has likely 
pushed down long-term interest rates further. 
The asymmetry in monetary policy was compounded by the liberalization of the global financial 
system. The latter is epitomized by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which 
                                                 




deregulated the financial sector in the US. This Act allowed commercial and investment banks 
to consolidate, and opened up competition among banks, securities companies, and insurance 
companies. The sharp deterioration in the net foreign assets position of the US happened in the 
wake of deregulation of the financial sector. 
Table 2:  
Net Resource flows to Developing Countries and the PRC, 1960–2009  
(Billion Current US Dollars) 
Aggregate net resource flows
1 Total FDI and Portfolio Equity
Total PRC Total PRC
1982 117 1 11 0
1983 75 3 10 1
1984 72 5 9 1
1985 70 7 12 2
1986 73 8 9 2
1987 87 12 10 2
1988 97 12 18 3
1989 99 10 24 3
1990 139 14 25 3
1991 151 12 36 4
1992 207 28 53 11
1993 253 45 94 28
1994 240 49 113 34
1995 313 57 109 36
1996 316 57 144 40
1997 347 70 185 50
1998 276 33 159 45
1999 237 40 173 39
2000 211 42 163 45
2001 269 88 166 45
2002 218 57 163 52
2003 321 74 179 55
2004 424 103 244 66
2005 592 142 343 99
2006 721 156 454 121
2007 1,262 204 649 157
2008 882 155 544 157
2009 603 148 467 106  
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 
Note: 1 - Net flows on external debt +  
Net official development assistance and official aid received+ 
                  Foreign direct investment, net inflows + Portfolio equity, net inflows 
Asymmetric monetary policy and a liberalized global financial system fueled a surge in asset 
prices in industrialized economies, especially in the Anglo-Saxon  countries (White, 2007). 
Rising asset prices—particularly in the housing sector—led to a positive wealth effect and, 
combined with easier access to credit, led to increased domestic spending. Greater 
consumption spending eventually led to a sharp fall in savings. Internal imbalances therefore 
emerged and led to a widening of existing external imbalances. The recycling of surpluses from 
emerging economies further contributed to the increase in domestic spending and deterioration 






To summarize, the fiduciary dollar system has built-in weaknesses that lead to market failure. 
This was compounded by the liberalization of the global financial system. The result was a 
widening of the external deficits of many industrialized economies, particularly the US. There 
are two interpretations of the global imbalances. The “equilibrium” and “orthodox” views tend to 
treat the global imbalances as a consequence of imperfections in emerging market economies. 
On the other hand, the “disequilibrium” and “less orthodox” views acknowledge the importance 
of policies in industrialized economies, including the deregulation of their financial systems. The 
role of global imbalances in the 2008 crisis will shed light on which view is more credible. 
2.3  Global Imbalances and the 2008 Crisis 
The framework for analysis is depicted in Figure 3. Perhaps the best way to synthesize the 
various strands is to acknowledge that the global macroeconomic imbalances and the 2008 
crisis have common roots (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; Visco, 2009). The fundamental 
weaknesses of the fiduciary dollar standard and specific macroeconomic policies contributed to 
both global macroeconomic imbalances and the 2008 crisis. The vulnerability was exacerbated 
by the liberalization of the global financial system. 
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Source: Author’s formulation. 
 It remains an empirical issue which of these factors—the fiduciary dollar standard, 
macroeconomic policy, and liberalization of the financial system—and which particular elements 
of each factor, e.g., different exchange rate regimes, was more influential in driving the global 
imbalances and triggering various financial crises. A sample of related empirical work is 
presented in Box 1. 
An issue that has not been resolved is the possible direct relationship between the global 
imbalances and the 2008 financial crisis (the dotted line in Figure 3). Perhaps the more 
appropriate description is of imbalances as a ”handmaiden” to the crisis, i.e., as a more or less 
central contributor to the crisis (Suominen, 2010). The conventional wisdom is that imbalances 
relaxed the credit constraint in the US. The accompanying low real interest rates in turn fueled 
borrowing and the housing bubble. 
This is related to the view that the proximate causes of the 2008 crisis were financial in nature 
and emanated from specific segments of US financial markets. Existing imbalances at that time 
exacerbated the impact of the crisis, primarily by providing a conduit for rapid propagation 
worldwide (Visco, 2009). Economic agents had to consolidate their balance sheets and the 
degree of imbalance made the adjustment process difficult.  
The previous discussion refutes two major arguments. One is that the global imbalances are the 
underlying cause of crisis. Another is that the global imbalances were an essentially benign 
phenomenon (e.g. Cooper, 2007), reflecting the underdeveloped financial sectors in emerging 
economies. Both assertions fail to take into account various other factors that have made the 
international monetary system vulnerable.
3
3.  THE ROLE OF THE US DOLLAR 
 
A recurring theme throughout the post-war evolution of the international monetary system is the 
role of the dollar as both a global currency and an international reserve asset. This is an issue 
that cuts across the major areas shown in Figure 3. The major contention is that an international 
reserve system that is based on a national currency is inherently unstable. This is the famous 
Triffin Dilemma, which dealt with the primacy of the dollar. The shift to a fiduciary dollar standard 
exacerbated the situation, which is reflected in the global macroeconomic imbalances. 
Meanwhile, liberalization of the global financial system encouraged more risk taking, particularly 
by US investors. The role of the dollar allowed the risk to be spread easily outside the United 
States. 
Parallel to the equilibrium versus disequilibrium approach, there are also conflicting views about 
the impact of the dollar’s dominance. The discussion also includes the possibility and 
consequences of a decline in the role of the dollar. The debate spans a generation (see for 
example Triffin, 1978 and Eichengreen, 2009) and recently gained prominence after the critique 
of the Governor of the People’s Bank of China (Zhou, 2009). Governor Zhou proposed to 
“create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is able 
to remain stable in the long-run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-
based national currencies.” 
                                                 
3 Frankel (2007) summarizes the nine distinct arguments in favor of the view that the US current account deficit—and 
by affiliation, global macroeconomic imbalances— is sustainable and not a cause for worry: 1) The siblings are not 
twins; 2) Alleged investment boom; 3) Low US private savings; 4) Global savings glut; 5) It’s a big world; 6) Valuation 
effects will pay for it; 7) US as the World’s Banker; 8) “Dark Matter”; and 9) Bretton Woods II. Frankel refutes all these 




3.1  The Triffin Dilemma 
The original Triffin Dilemma under the dollar-gold exchange standard can be summarized as 
follows (Triffin, 1978): a) If the US corrected its persistent deficits, the growth of world reserves 
could not be fed adequately by gold production at $35 an ounce; but if b) the US deficits 
continued, its foreign liabilities would far exceed its ability to convert them into gold upon 
demand, and bring about a dollar and gold crisis. 
Under the fiduciary dollar standard, the Triffin Dilemma has different characteristics (Ocampo, 
2009; Mateos, et al. 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009). With global capital flows and more flexible 
exchange rates, US monetary policy has become more independent. The US does not have to 
deal with the constraint imposed by dollar-gold convertibility as flexible exchange rates in theory 
should take care of adjusting the demand and supply of dollars. Global liquidity could be 
provided with the US running persistent current account deficits and/or investing in assets 
abroad. 
Instability in the international monetary system has come about because many economies have 
chosen to stabilize their currencies in relation to the dollar and hold dollars for that purpose 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2010). US monetary policy has therefore been transmitted almost 
automatically to the rest of the world. More importantly, the system has exempted the US from 
the discipline with which the other countries have to comply. Triffin’s Dilemma could therefore 
be generalized as follows: 
“…the stability requirements for the system as a whole are inconsistent with the pursuit of 
economic and monetary policy forged solely on the basis of domestic rationales in all monetary 
regimes devoid of some form of supranationality.” (Padoa-Schioppa, 2010: 11) 
3.2  System Maker and Privilege Taker 
The role of the dollar allowed the US to be a “system maker and privilege taker” (Mastanduno, 
2009). This is consistent with the primary role of the US in global governance, particularly with 
regard to security matters. It will be useful to summarize the political-economic factors that led 
to this state of affairs. The interplay between economics and politics will determine the feasibility 
of the current proposals to reform the international monetary system. 
The term “system maker and privilege taker” suggests a dual role that the US has played in 
international economic relations over the past 60 years. On the one hand, the US was the 
primary driver behind the establishment of the liberal economic order. This was highlighted in 
later years by the Washington Consensus. Subsequently, in the second phase the US 
“defended that order in the face of internal and external challenges, and in the third phase they 
enlarged the order geographically and functionally. In each phase, the United States took 
advantage of its privileged position and was forced to confront systemic imbalances and 
adjustment struggles.”
4
The relationship to the role of the dollar, particularly during the period of the dollar-gold 
exchange standard, is explained as follows:
 
5
“The U.S. dollar was the lynchpin of the transatlantic and transpacific deal. Freer 
trade depended on monetary stability, which, in turn, depended on the special 
role of the dollar. While governments in Western Europe and Japan committed to 
 
                                                 
4 Mastanduno (2009), page 123. 




defending the value of their currencies relative to the dollar, the U.S. government 
took on the more formidable obligations of maintaining a fixed value for the dollar 
in terms of gold and of agreeing to accept dollars from other central banks in 
exchange for gold at that fixed rate. By upholding a pledge that the dollar was 
‘good as gold,’ U.S. officials provided the confidence that public and private 
actors needed to embrace the special reserve and liquidity functions of the dollar 
in the world economy. 
This critical role for the dollar granted a well-understood privilege  to U.S. 
policymakers. As long as other governments proved willing to hold dollars, U.S. 
external deficits could be financed essentially by printing money and lending it 
abroad, enabling the United States to pursue a variety of foreign and domestic 
policy objectives without necessarily confronting difficult trade-offs in the short 
term. Allied governments in Western Europe and Japan were willing 
collaborators. The dollars held  by their central banks financed the U.S. 
commitment to guarantee their security, including the most tangible manifestation 
of that commitment, the stationing of U.S.  troops on their territories. Equally 
important, as allied economies recovered during the 1950s and 1960s, their 
central banks purchased and accumulated dollars in order to prevent local 
currencies from appreciating beyond the acceptable range of their fixed 
exchange rates. By meeting their obligations they maintained undervalued 
currencies, which in turn enabled them to maintain a competitive export position 
in the large U.S. market. 
Robert Triffin famously recognized that this elegant monetary system was based 
on an inherent contradiction. The United States needed to run balance of 
payments deficits to supply liquidity to the world economy. But the United States 
also needed to maintain confidence in the dollar as a store of value—confidence 
that would be undermined by large and persistent external deficits. The success 
of the arrangement required U.S. policymakers to strike a delicate balance. They 
needed to run payments deficits large enough to provide adequate dollar flows to 
the world economy, yet not so large as to trigger an international crisis of 
confidence in the dollar. 
The U.S. balance  of payments needed to be responsive to this precise 
requirement of system management. American officials were aware of this 
obligation throughout the 1960s yet ultimately chose to give priority to U.S. policy 
autonomy. The U.S. balance of payments position was more a function of U.S. 
domestic and foreign policy choices than a response to the stringent demands of 
the liquidity-confidence paradox. This became most apparent during the 
escalation of the Viet Nam War, when the Johnson administration opted for guns 
and butter—an activist military policy abroad and an ambitious expansion of the 
welfare state at home—and financed both not by raising taxes but by allowing the 
expansion of dollar holdings by foreign central banks.” 
The practical consequences of the dominance of the dollar is that it allowed the US government 
to dispense with the traditional choice between guns, butter, and economic growth 
(Mastanduno, 2009; D’Arista and Griffith-Jones, 2006). The deficits of the US were 
automatically financed by the rest of the world. As mentioned earlier, some analysts have 
quipped that the US has been “living beyond its means”.  




3.3  Support from Major Allies 
One critical aspect is that this dual role of the US has to be supported by its major global 
partners. This support is the primary source of ”confidence” in the dollar as a global currency 
and international reserve asset. This was evident in the 1960s when Germany—West Germany 
in that era—did not join France in criticizing the exorbitant privilege enjoyed by the US. 
Mastanduno (2009) explains that at that time it was widely recognized on both sides of the 
Atlantic that the most obvious solution to the US balance-of-payments problem was the 
withdrawal of US troops from Europe. However, because of its security implications, West 
Germany made the necessary economic adjustments to accommodate the US deficit. 
Teunissen (2009) narrated Triffin’s acknowledgement that “Americans and most Europeans saw 
the maintenance of the dollar as the reserve currency as a way of financing their joint defense”. 
An interesting issue is how the analysis applies in the context of a fiduciary dollar standard. It 
has been argued that the “exorbitant privilege” grew stronger under the fiduciary dollar standard 
because of capital and exchange rate gains on the net liability position of the US. Since a large 
portion of the US investment position is composed of dollar denominated liabilities and US 
assets are mostly denominated in foreign currency, there is a built-in protection against the 
depreciation of the dollar. In addition, data show that, on average, the US enjoys higher returns 
on its assets than it pays on its liabilities (Norrlof, 2010). 
This is related to the argument that the fiduciary dollar standard allowed the US to incur larger 
current account deficits. Not surprisingly the US current account balance has been in a deficit 
position since 1981 with a relatively sharp deterioration between 1982 and 1987 (Figure 1). This 
was the time that there was an immense flow of Japanese capital into the US economy.  
Japanese finance came after West Germany’s unwillingness in October 1979 to support the 
dollar and import American inflation (Gilpin, 1987). The latter caused the US to change its 
domestic economic policy and to shift to a tighter monetary policy. By the mid-1980s, Japan had 
replaced West Germany as America’s principal economic ally. Japanese capital allowed the 
Reagan administration to simultaneously stimulate US domestic consumption and commence 
the largest military expansion in peacetime US history (Gilpin, 1987). The issues that were 
emerging at that time bear a striking resemblance to those that presently confront the PRC and 
the US (see Box 2). 
One of the issues then was whether Japan should establish itself as the financial hegemon of 
East Asia and not merely subsidize American hegemony. The issue was essentially resolved by 
the 1986 Baker-Miyazawa deal, which was described as another example of the ability of the 
US to shift the burden of adjustment onto other countries (Norrlof, 2010). “Not only was Japan 
persuaded to cut interest rates and stimulate demand through fiscal packages, but the United 
States used the settlement reached with Miyazawa to extract macro-economic concessions 
from a recalcitrant Germany.”
6
There is a debate about whether the sharp yen appreciation caused the subsequent stagnation 
of the Japanese economy for nearly two decades. For example, Corbett and Ito (2010: 5) argue 
that “refusing to accept yen appreciation (not caving in to yen appreciation) was one of the 
causes of the bubble economy toward the end of the 1980s in Japan.” This argument disproves 
the notion that US pressure was a factor in Japan’s economic stagnation. However, Corbett and 
 Specifically, West Germany agreed to greater tax cuts than it had 
budgeted. The Baker-Miyazawa deal came in the midst of the Plaza-Louvre accords in 1985 
and 1987, which resulted in a sharp appreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the dollar. The US was 
therefore able to engineer a strong economic recovery and a soft landing of the dollar. 
                                                 




Ito: (2010: 3) do admit that “what caused the bubble to expand and become more dangerous 
was the low interest rate policy of 1987–1989.” The latter was part of the Baker-Miyazawa deal. 
Moreover, the sharp yen appreciation caused the hollowing out of Japan’s domestic industry 
which is an integral part of the economic stagnation. The unemployment rate in Japan increased 
from 2% in 1980 to 4.8% in 2000. It reached 5.1% in 2009. 
Like West Germany, Japan’s accommodation can also be traced to America’s “security card”. 
As Norrlof argues: “The formal defense commitments that go out to Japan and South Korea also 
give two of the five largest reserve holders a powerful incentive to prevent American decline.”
7 
Gilpin was less sympathetic when he stated: “One political and psychological problem is that 
such relationship converts the American military into a mercenary force defending Japan in 
return for Japanese capital.”
8
3.4  Does a Problem Really Exist? 
 In this context, the imbalance in global governance—which is 
narrowly defined as the provision of a security umbrella—is the primary source of the global 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
The argument made so far is that one of the root causes of the imbalances and instability in the 
international monetary system is the role of the dollar. However, some analysts tend to overlook 
this particular problem. After all, the major industrialized and emerging economies benefited 
from the dollar-based system. They have gained access to the large open market of the US 
which aided their export-led development strategies. The projection of US military power 
protected the flow of vital raw materials. The security umbrella provided political stability, which 
is crucial to investment decisions. It also enabled these economies to allocate more resources 
to improving their productivity. In other words, these economies should consider the instability of 
the international monetary system as a quid pro quo for their overall development. 
Some analysts have argued that dollar dominance is a reflection of the US economy’s large 
size, credible monetary policy, and the dollar’s high liquidity, rather than a symptom of an unfair 
international monetary system (Brouwer, 2007). This is echoed by Mateos y Lago, Duttagupta, 
and Goyal (2009: 7) when they state: 
“That said, while in the early decades of the Bretton Woods system the dollar’s 
primacy was rooted in law, this has not been the case for the past 30 years: 
dollar reserves have been accumulated as a matter of choice and the track 
record of U.S. policies over decades has, in the main, helped preserve 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Its open capital account and deep 
financial markets have contributed to growth in global trade in goods and assets, 
as scale economies in the use of the dollar have materialized. In that sense, the 
relative return on assets could be seen as payment for world banking services, 
and what privilege the dollar enjoys is an earned one.” 
These views are reflected in various proposals related to the imbalances. For example, Kregel 
(2009) points out that the deflationary bias of the fiduciary dollar standard implies that the most 
fundamental problem of any international monetary arrangement is the operation of the 
adjustment mechanism in the face of global imbalances, rather than the specific asset that 
serves as the international currency.  
The credibility of the dollar based on liquid markets and a highly sophisticated financial system 
is a self-reinforcing feature (Eichengreen, 2009). Foreign investors undertake their transactions 
                                                 
7 Norrlof (2010), page 186.  




and concentrate their holdings in US markets because these markets are liquid, and that 
activity, in turn, makes them more liquid.
9
In other words, the use of the dollar is driven primarily by sheer inertia. Another perspective is 
that monetary privilege facilitates commercial expansion and, at the same time, commercial 
strength reinforces the monetary privilege (Norrlof, 2010). 
 This can be described as the “first-mover advantage” 
which was echoed by Triffin when he lamented the large role played by “routine and fear of 
change” when it comes to reform of the international monetary system (Teunissen, 2009). 
That the status quo is not sustainable should be evident from the discussion in Chapter 2. The 
fiduciary dollar standard is prone to generating macroeconomic imbalances and periodic 
financial and currency crises. While many economies have benefited from the liberal economic 
order that was supported either directly or indirectly by the fiduciary dollar standard, many 
emerging and low income countries can develop faster with a more stable international 
monetary system.  
3.5  Demand Side versus Supply Side 
Addressing the shortcomings of the fiduciary dollar system has a similar dimension to the issue 
of global macroeconomic imbalances. Should the focus of adjustment be on the demand side or 
the supply side? The latter postulates that the US exploits its exorbitant privilege and spends 
too much. On the other hand, emerging economies, particularly the PRC, take advantage of the 
deep and liquid US financial markets and channel their surpluses into US treasury bills. 
The previous discussion emphasized the supply side based on the role of the US as a system 
maker and privilege taker. However, some analysts are critical of the single-minded pursuit of 
an export oriented strategy by certain economies (e.g., Jones, 2009). The current account 
surpluses generated by this strategy created a savings glut which found its way into dollar 
denominated assets. Because of the surge in investible funds “US financial institutions quite 
literally did not know what to do with the vast pool of liquidity at their disposal and so they 
switched from investing in the real economy to speculating in financial instruments.”
10
The demand side of the debate does not quite jibe with the empirical results described in Box 1. 
However, even a cursory look at the data indicates that the surge in imbalances emanated 
primarily from the supply side. The faster deterioration of the net international investment 
position of the US (Figure 2) occurred after financial markets were deregulated in 1999. This 
has been accompanied by a steady climb of the PRC’s share in international reserves beginning 
2001. 
 
While it can be argued that the PRC’s current account surpluses have risen sharply since 2005 
(Table 3), this was actually accompanied by an increase in the net international liabilities of the 
US after 2005. The PRC’s current account surplus at its peak, moreover, was only half of the 






                                                 
9 Eichengreen (2009), page 57. 





Table 3: Current Account Balance of the PRC 















2009 5.96 2.10  
Source: WDI, ADBKI 
4.  POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM 
Reforming the international monetary system has two related dimensions. The first would be to 
implement measures intended to directly narrow macroeconomic imbalances. This would limit 
opportunities to exploit the exorbitant privilege of the US. The only way for these imbalances to 
be efficiently narrowed would be through a significant increase in US net exports (Grenville, 
2010). The second approach would be to dilute or even eliminate the exorbitant privilege by 
reducing the role of the dollar as a global currency and international reserve asset. The various 
proposals and their prospects are discussed in this chapter. 
4.1  Narrowing Global Imbalances 
Global macroeconomic imbalances actually narrowed in the aftermath of the crisis. The US 
current account deficit fell to 2.7% of GDP in 2009, the lowest level since 1998 (Figure 1). 
Meanwhile, total international reserves grew by only 9.4% in 2009 after recording double digit 
growth rates between 2004 and 2008 (Table 2). Admittedly, this was a direct consequence of 
the crisis. Economic agents had to adjust their balance sheets and spending in response to the 
bad debts that materialized. 
The key question is whether this trend can be sustained. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
projects that the US current account deficit will be 3.2% and 2.6% of GDP in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively.
11
                                                 
11 Forecasts of current account balances of the US and the PRC are obtained from the October 2010 IMF World 
Economic Outlook. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/c2.pdf 
 This is partly in response to the depreciation of the dollar. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to imagine further consolidation given the unemployment problem in the US. Moreover, 




fiscal measures are put in place. Given the lack of political will in the US with regard to raising 
taxes
12
Meanwhile, the PRC’s current account surplus fell to 6% of GDP in 2009 (Table 3) and the IMF 
projects a further drop, to 4.7%, in 2010, before a slight recovery, to 5.1% of GDP. In this 
context, the analysis should focus on whether the PRC will allow the renminbi to appreciate 
significantly. There are several reasons why this is unlikely. 
, global macroeconomic imbalances from the supply side are expected to persist.  
One, there are sound theoretical reasons why an appreciation of the renminbi will not generate 
the desired effects (McKinnon, 2010). These reasons are related to the fact that imbalances are 
both reflected in the current account and the disparity in savings and investment levels. An 
exchange rate adjustment may be coursed through the difference between savings and 
investment, thus negating changes in exports and imports due to price movements. 
Two,  the  PRC is aware of the adverse effects on the Japanese economy of the sharp 
appreciation of the yen between 1985 and 1987. Hence, it is adopting a more cautious policy. 
Three, which is closely related to the second aspect, the level of development of the PRC in 
2010 is much lower compared with Japan and Europe. At the time there were major 
adjustments in the international monetary system in which the latter were involved. The data are 
shown in Table 4. It can be argued that Europe bore the brunt of the adjustment in the 1970s, 
while Japan absorbed the largest impact in the 1980s (Mastanduno, 2009; Norloff, 2010). The 
data show the importance of Europe, Japan, and the PRC to the US at various stages. In 1970, 
Europe—as represented by the European Union 15—had a relatively large share of US 
securities (32.8% based on 1978 data), but the US accounted for a relatively small share of its 
export market, namely 7.9%. Japan in 1985 accounted for 10.5% of US securities, but the US 
market share of its exports was 37.6%. The PRC in 2009 held 15.2% of US securities and 
18.4% of its exports went to the US. 
Table 4: Comparison of Macroeconomic Indicators 
GDP per capita  US share in exports  Unemployment rate  Holdings of US treasuries 
(constant 2000 USD) % % (share in %)*
EU 15 (1970) 10,983 7.9 2.3 32.8
Japan (1985) 27,012 37.6 2.6 10.5
PRC (2009) 2,206 18.4 4.3 15.2  
Note: *Data are 1978 for EU 15, 1984 for Japan 
Sources: WDI, WITS, ADBKI, BLS, IFS, ILO, US Department of Treasury 
While all three economic power blocs were fairly important to US in the periods cited—albeit at 
varying degrees—Europe in 1970 and Japan in 1985 had much higher per capita incomes than 
the PRC in 2009. Both also had lower unemployment rates than the PRC in the same years. 
Therefore, it will be more difficult for the PRC to perform the roles that Europe and Japan did in 
terms of economic adjustment. 
Four, the PRC does not share the same security concerns as Japan and Europe. Hence it does 
not have the same incentive to bear an inequitable share of the burden in consolidating the 
global macroeconomic imbalances. As a matter of fact, the PRC is usually on the “opposite 
side” with regard to regional conflicts and disputes. These include, among others: i) the North 
Korea issue where the PRC is perceived to support the former; ii) the dispute over the Spratly 
                                                 
12 Evidence of this lack of political will to deal with fiscal consolidation was the signing of a bill containing a package 
that retained  Bush-era tax rates for all taxpayers, including the wealthiest Americans, by President Obama in 




Islands, wherein the PRC has a claim along with the Philippines; Viet Nam; Taipei,China; and 
Malaysia;
13 iii) the lingering issue with regard to Taipei,China, with the US being bound by the 
Taipei,China Relations Act of 1979
14
Lastly, the PRC has apparently taken steps to reduce its holdings of US Treasuries. During the 
first seven months of 2010, the PRC not only refrained from buying any more US government 
paper, but even began to sell its holdings. At least one analyst has pointed out that this is the 
primary reason the US has been criticizing the PRC more heavily about the undervaluation of 
the renminbi.
; and iv) border disputes with Japan, India, and Viet Nam. 
15
Given these considerations, it is highly unlikely that concrete measures will be taken by either 
the US or the PRC to narrow the global imbalances in the near future. An impasse between the 
two countries is likely to ensue.
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4.2  Reform of the International Financial Architecture 
  Attention, therefore, will be on international and regional 
efforts to reduce the role of the dollar as a global currency and international reserve asset. 
Proposals for reform of the international financial architecture range from the ambitious—a 
single global currency as proposed by noted economists such as John Maynard Keynes and 
Robert Mundell—to more practical measures, e.g., expanding the use of Special Drawing Rights 
(Ocampo, 2009; Zhou, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010; Eichengreen, 2009). Exchange rate 
arrangements have also been proposed, like the recommendation of a common currency 
between the US and Europe accompanied by monetary unions among countries with similar 
economic structures—which would result in regional currencies (Campanella, 2010). 
Reducing the role of the dollar would also require replacing the liquid and highly sophisticated 
financial systems that are anchored on the dollar. For example, financial markets where the 
Special Drawing Rights can be traded should be created. 
All these proposals, however, require collective action, particularly among the major 
industrialized economies. Given the dominant role of the dollar, the US is unlikely to support any 
drastic change in the current international monetary system. With the ”exorbitant” privilege, the 
US has more of an incentive to maintain the status quo. 
Moreover, the US still bears a disproportionate share of responsibility with regard to global 
governance. Table 5 shows that the US is by far the largest military spender in the world. In 
2009 defense spending in the US accounted for 4.6% of GDP
17
                                                 
13 In the middle of 2010, the US raised the stakes in this controversy by rejecting outright the claim of the PRC on the 
Spratly Islands. 
  and 17.9% of central 
14 See HR 2479(http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d096:H.R.2479:). 
15 This paragraph is based on the op-ed column of Hans-Werner Sinn entitled “Fair-weather Friends” that appeared 
on page 4 of the Business World, October 28, 2010, Volume XXIV, Issue 68. 
16 It remains to be seen whether the state visit of President Hu Jintao to the US in January, 2011 will break the 
impasse. The Joint Statement released by the Office of the Press Secretary (2011) contains an encouraging 
reference to “using the full range of policies to strengthen the global recovery and to reduce excessive imbalances 
and maintain current account imbalances at sustainable levels.” With regard to specific economic policies, “the United 
States will focus on reducing its medium-term federal deficit and ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability, and will 
maintain vigilance against excess volatility in exchange rates” while “China will intensify efforts to expand domestic 
demand, to promote private investment in the service sector, and to give greater play to the fundamental role of the 
market in resource allocation.  China  will continue to promote  yuan  exchange rate reform and enhance yuan 
exchange rate flexibility, and promote the transformation of its economic development model.”  
 




government expenditure. Reducing the US dollar’s role (and fiscal consolidation) is likely to be 
accompanied by a diminished global presence of American security. Since both Europe and 
East Asia rely on the US economically and militarily, collective action to dislodge the dollar as a 
primary global reserve currency is unlikely. 
Table 5: Cross-country Comparison of Military Expenditures 
Share of world military expenditures (%) 1988 2007 2008
US 41 44 45
Euro-16 NA 15 15
EU-12/EU-27 16 22 21
PRC* 1 5 5
Japan 3 4 3
Soviet Union/Russia 18 3 3
India 1 2 2  
Note: *1989 figure for the PRC 
Source: Table 2.1 of Norrlof (2010). Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
4.3  Reform at the Regional Level 
Given the grim prospects for narrowing global imbalances and reforming the international 
financial architecture, the best chance for meaningful change in the international monetary 
system seems to lie in regional efforts. Asia has made great strides in the area of regional 
cooperation and integration (e.g., ADB, 2008). Financial and monetary cooperation has figured 
prominently, as epitomized by the Chiang Mai Initiative and its multilateralization. 
Financial and monetary cooperation has also explored means to reduce dependence on the 
dollar for international transactions. For example, extensive work has already been done on the 
Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) and the Asian Bond Fund (ABF). This is part of a 
concerted effort to develop capital markets in the region and reduce dependence on US 
financial markets.
18
Proposals have also been made for closer exchange rate coordination, the establishment of an 
Asian Currency Unit, and eventually a regional currency. Rising intra-regional trade in East Asia 
provides a basis for increased exchange rate coordination. The establishment of a regional 




However, similar to reforms to reduce the dominance of the dollar at the international level, 
these initiatives are constrained by the collective action problem. In the case of East Asia 
cooperation between Japan and the PRC is a sine qua non for regional monetary cooperation to 
succeed. Certainly both countries have to overcome their political differences, particularly on 
security issues. 
 This will reduce dependence on the use of the dollar. 
After a rather lengthy discussion on the role of the dollar and the need to reduce global 
imbalances, prospects at the regional level have come down to a very well known fact: Japan 
and the PRC need to cooperate more closely, both politically and economically, for East Asian 
                                                 
18 Development of the financial market should also include the short-term capital market. In addition, efficient forward 
markets as well as other foreign exchange derivatives should be developed to allow firms to hedge the exchange rate 
risk. The author is grateful to Professor Shin-ichi Fukuda of the University of Tokyo for these recommendations. 




economic cooperation and integration to progress, and for the region to be significantly 
insulated from the vagaries of the global economy.  
5.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Since fundamental reform will take some time, East Asia has to contend with the fiduciary dollar 
standard for the foreseeable future. In the short-term the more crucial aspect is dealing with 
capital inflows. The latest source of these inflows is the US policy of looser monetary policy 
implemented through quantitative easing. Adjustment will be difficult for developing countries 
which are experiencing relatively strong economic growth and inflationary rather than 
deflationary pressures. Three macro policy alternatives are available for developing countries 
(Brahmbhatt, et al. 2010). Which of the three options is most suited for a particular economy is a 
topic beyond the scope of this paper. 
The first option is to pursue independent monetary policies that target their own inflation and 
activity levels, combined with relatively flexible exchange rates and open capital accounts. The 
second would be to maintain a fixed exchange rate peg and open capital account while ceding 
control of monetary policy as an independent policy instrument. 
Another option is implementing capital controls, which have proven be effective in several 
economies (see for example Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo, 2004). However, with the advent of 
greater financial integration, capital controls, particularly on inflows, have to be endorsed at the 
international level to be effective (Grenville, 2007). Given that this would require IMF 
endorsement, international backing of any form of capital controls is unlikely. Hence, 
endorsement at the regional level would be a second best solution. 
In the longer term, the region should pursue rebalancing. Since a favorable external 
environment is crucial for achieving sustainable economic growth and the timing of recovery of 
industrialized economies is uncertain, rebalancing the sources toward greater domestic and 
regional demand is important. In this context, it is important to distinguish between rebalancing 
at the regional level and rebalancing at the national level (or domestic level) and to assess how 
these two processes relate to each other. A framework as shown in Figure 4 should be 
developed and be the basis for appropriate policies. 
Figure 4: Linking Regional and Domestic Rebalancing 
























Some experts have noted that Asia’s outward-oriented development model does not need to be 
overhauled. What will be required is adjustment in net exports and some shift toward production 
for Asian demand. In other words, the main thrust of regional rebalancing should be an increase 
in intra-regional trade and investment among East Asian economies, but with more of the final 
exports going to economies in the region instead of the US and Western Europe. In order to 
facilitate this transition, some economies have to import more from their neighbors, which 
implies increasing their domestic spending, i.e., consumption and investment. The strategy of 
coordinating regional and domestic rebalancing will allow the economies of East Asia to retain 




Box 1: Empirical Evidence Related to Global Macroeconomic Imbalances 
The study of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) contains a footnote—number 5—  listing various 
empirical studies that can help shed light on various issues related to the debate between the 
equilibrium and disequilibrium views. The relevant quote is as follows: 
“Gruber and Kamin (2008) argue that as an empirical matter, conventional measures of financial 
development explain neither the size of the net capital flows from emerging to mature economies, 
nor their concentration on U.S. assets. Gruber and Kamin also argue that U.S. bond yields have 
been comparable to those of other industrial countries, contrary to the view that American 
liabilities have been especially attractive to foreign portfolio investors. Acharya and Schnabl 
(2010) show that banks in industrial surplus and deficit countries alike set up extensive asset 
backed commercial paper conduits to issue purportedly risk-free short-term liabilities and 
purchase risky longer-term assets from industrial deficit countries, mostly denominated in dollars. 
This finding also throws doubt on the hypothesis that emerging-market demand for risk-free 
assets that only the U.S. could provide was the underlying cause of the U.S. current account 
deficit.” 
Serven and Nguyen (2010) briefly look at the studies that determine whether accumulation of 
foreign international reserves was prompted by a precautionary saving motive or by a desire to 
prevent currencies from appreciating,** 
“Even if we accept the view that the accumulation of international reserves, or external assets 
more broadly, was a deliberate policy choice of emerging economies, the question remains 
whether it was driven by caution against the volatility of international capital flows, or by the 
pursuance of competitive exchange rates. Assessing the relative weight of these two factors is 
not an easy task. Moreover, their respective roles likely differ across countries and over time. 
Aizenman and Lee (2007) examine the question empirically using data from 49 countries in the 
1980‐2000 period, and conclude that both motives were at work, but the precautionary saving 
motive was more important. Jeanne and Ranciere (2009), in turn, conclude that the accumulation 
of external assets after 2000 has been too large, particularly in Asia, to be justified by the 
precaution motive alone. 
“On the other hand, if deliberate policy choices of the economic authorities had been the main 
force behind the accumulation of assets on the United States, capital inflows to the U.S. should 
reflect a dominant role of official flows over private flows. Data show that the picture is more 
mixed. Net purchases of U.S. assets by official entities (central banks and other government 
bodies) from emerging markets in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East have grown 
increasingly large in the 2000s. After the onset of the crisis in 2007, they became the sole source 
of inflows from these countries. However, over the decade as a whole the total volume of 
emerging‐market official inflows to the U.S. was roughly on par with that of private inflows. 
Thus, the big role played by private capital in the total flows from emerging markets in the run up 
to the crisis seems to lend some support also to the first version of the equilibrium approach 
summarized earlier, which explains global imbalances primarily on the basis of asymmetries in 
the supply and/or investors’ demand for international assets. Forbes (2010) offers some 
corroborating evidence, based on an analysis of the geographic origin of private capital flows to 
the U.S. She finds that investors from countries with less developed financial markets tend to hold 
greater shares of their investment portfolios in the U.S. This fact in accordance with the 
equilibrium approach views of Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2008a,b) and Mendoza, Quadrini 
and Ríos‐Rull (2009) discussed above.” 
The relevant references can be found in the studies. There is an apparent contradiction in the 
findings. 





Box 2: International Finance Issues Centering on US-Japan, mid-1980s 
One of the seminal works in international political economy, The Political Economy of 
International Relations by Robert Gilpin (1987), provides a section on the Nichbei Economy and 
its Prospects. He was referring to the increased integration of the US and Japanese economies. 
The issues he raised bear striking resemblance to the discussion of the political and economic 
relations of the US and the PRC after the first decade of the 21
st
“…The United States therefore finds itself caught in a vicious cycle. On the 
one hand, it requires foreign capital to finance its budget deficit. On the other 
hand, the availability of foreign capital causes a greatly overvalued dollar and 
weakens its industrial base. A weakened economy in turn increases the need 
for foreign capital, and the drain of interest payments further undermines the 
competitiveness of the economy. 
 century. Some excerpts:** 
“…Doubts have also arisen on the Japanese side…A number of political and 
economic leaders have begun to ask whether it is in the long-term interest of 
Japan to finance American prosperity and the international hegemony whose 
primary concerns are different from Japan’s. The view that Japan could make 
better use of its newly granted financial power and emergent role as a 
financial center was expressed in a report by the influential Nomura Research 
Institute…In brief, Japan should establish itself as the financial hegemon of 
the fastest growing region in the world and not merely subsidize American 
hegemony.” 
“…Would Japan continue to support the dollar,  or would it ally itself with 
Western Europe? Whatever decisions the Japanese make regarding the use 
of their growing financial power will have profound significance for the future 
of the international economic and political system.” 
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